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ESSAY

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: POLITICAL
LOYALTY V. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
-

THE ETHICAL CHALLENGE IN SERVING

THREE MASTERS
It is not the fault of any creed, but of the complicated nature of
human affairs, that rules of conduct cannot be so framed as to require no exceptions, and that hardly any kind of action can safely be
laid down as either always obligatory or always condemnable. There
is no ethical creed which does not temper the rigidity of its laws by
giving certain latitude, under the moral responsibility of the agent,
for accommodation to peculiarities of circumstances; and under
every creed, at the opening thus made, self-deception and dishonest
casuistry get in. There exists no moral system under which there do
not arise unequivocal cases of conflicting obligation. These are the
real difficulties, the knotty points both in the theory of ethics and in
the conscientious guidance of personal conduct. They are overcome
practically, with greater or with less success, according to the intellect and virtue of the individual; but it can hardly be presented that
anyone will be less qualified for dealing with them, from possessing
an ultimate standard to which conflicting rights and duties can be
referred.... Though the application of the standardmay be difficult,
it is better than none at all.'
Perhaps nowhere is the nature of human affairs more complicated than in the processes of government. By definition, governing
requires a distribution of power in order to effect the government's
underlying principles: to ensure order, and to achieve legitimate
goals.2 The real difficulties emerge with the ethical dilemmas inherent in the exercise of power. Who should be entrusted with power
and whose interests should those in power serve? What ethical imperatives should guide their conduct? The conclusions to these
questions have practical consequences, as well as philosophical
relevance.
1. J. S.

MILL, UTILITARIANISM 32 (1863) (emphasis supplied).
2. Webster's definition of govern includes: "to exercise authority over; rule, control, etc.; to influence the action of; guide; to determine." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY 263 (2d ed. 1984).
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The American democratic system of government vests the republic's supreme power in the citizens. The people choose, directly
or indirectly, representatives to exercise that power. In return, the
people expect government officials (and government) to be responsive, responsible, and accountable.' The peoples' representatives are
charged with upholding the Constitution and conducting the business of government for the benefit of all.
Preventing the abuse of power is a central problem of any civilization.4 In our democratic society, the United States Constitution
limits governmental power by dividing responsibilities in the federal
system between the states and the central government and then
within the central government into the Executive, Legislative, and
Judicial branches.' The separation of the powers of government is
"to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men."'6 Accordingly, the law is the foundation of the tripartite division of
power, allowing each branch to work independently of, and in conjunction with, one another. The American people have assigned government officials the task of determining not only what the law is,
but also what it should be, and vested them with the authority to
make the appropriate changes.'
3. M. REJAI, COMPARATIVE POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 89-109 (1984).
4. G. TINDER, POLITICAL THINKING, THE PERENNIAL QUESTIONS (1986).
5. Comment, The Confrontation of the Legislative and Executive Branches:
An Examination of the ConstitutionalBalance of Powers and the Role of the Attorney General, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 331 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Constitutional
Balance of Powers].
6. The idea that rulers establish institutions which then mold the rulers was
expressed in Montesquieu's SPIRIT OF LAWS (1748) and influenced many of the framers of the Constitution. W. SAFIRE, SAFIRE'S POLITICAL DICTIONARY 267 (1978). John
Adams, writing on the separation of powers, said:
[t]he law proceeds from the will of man, whether a monarch or people; and
that this will must have a mover; and that this mover is interest-it is the
public interest; and where the public interest governs, it is government of laws,
and not of men: the interest of a king, or a party, is another thing-it is a
private interest; and where private interest governs, it is a government of men,
and not of laws.
E. RICHARDSON, THE CREATIVE BALANCE 2 (1976). The phrase "government of law and
not of men" has become a maxim signifying the administration of justice wherein all
men stand equal before the bar. W. SAFIRE, supra at 267. Chief Justice John Marshall
declared the same view of government in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
163 (1803). More recently, the phrase was used by Archibald Cox when President
Nixon fired him as the Special Prosecutor to investigate the Watergate cover-up. Cox
remarked, "whether ours shall continue to be a government of laws and not of men is
now for the Congress and ultimately for the American people." W. SAFIRE, supra at
267.
7. Miller, The Attorney General as the President's Lawyer, in ROLES OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 41, 43 (1963) [hereinafter Miller]. In 1835,
De Tocqueville observed:
The American institutions are democratic, not only in their principle but in all
their consequences; and the people elects its representatives directly, and for
the most part annually, in order to insure their dependence. The people is
therefore the real directing power; and although the form of government is
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The Constitution provides that the President "shall take care
that the laws be faithfully executed," however, it makes no mention
of any legal officer to represent the government.8 The first Congress
created the office of Attorney General in the Judiciary Act of 1789
to "prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which
the United States shall be concerned." 9 Congress failed to provide a
"specific statement of the general duties of the attorney general," or
to define the scope of the Attorney General's authority. 0 The ambiguous nature of the office gives rise to many undetermined issues.
These issues are further complicated by dictates of representative
government. This essay will first briefly look at the role of the Attorney General. It will then examine the questions of whose interests
the Attorney General represents and what special ethical problems
the Attorney General encounters in the exercise of his" professional
responsibilities. 12 The essay will conclude that a "conduct specific"
code of ethics supplemented by a "broad principles" standard may
properly address the Attorney General's ethical dilemma.

I.

THE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The Office of the Attorney General has changed considerably
since its inception.13 This is due partly to the growth of the nation
and partly as a result of governmental activism.' With the estabrepresentative, it is evident that the opinions, the prejudices, the interests, and
even the passions of the community are hindered by no durable obstacles from
exercising a perpetual influence on society.
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 110 (H. Reeve trans. 1945).

8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
9. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 93 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
503 (1982)).
10. United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273 (1888) (The court, noting
the lack of expressed powers, analogized the Attorney General's implied powers to
those common law powers of his British counterpart).
11. The masculine pronouns used throughout this essay are intended as genderneutral pronouns, notwithstanding the statutory language creating the Office of Attorney General and the historical reality.
12. The question has most often been posed as "who is the client?" One commentator suggests that answering this question fails to clarify the unique nature of
the government lawyer's professional responsibilities. Lawry, Who is the Client of the
Federal Government Lawyer? An Analysis of the Wrong Question, 37 FED. B.J. 61
(1978).
13. Huston, History of the Office of the Attorney General, in ROLES OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 1, 3 (1963) [hereinafter Huston].
14. Originally, the Attorney General's position did not demand much of his
time so that he could continue in private practice when he was not needed in Washington. Huston, supra note 13, at 5-6. Congress kept the Attorney General's legal
domain and power limited out of financial necessity and fear of too strong an Attorney General. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government's Chief Lawyer
and Chief Litigator,of One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 1049, 1050-57 (1978).
Over the years, Congress enacted laws creating numerous entities to serve various
governmental functions. The administration of these entities fell piecemeal to the
Attorney General causing an expansion of his domain. Id.
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lishment of the Department of Justice in 1870, the Attorney General
became the head of what was to become the most significant law
office in the country.' 5 His role expanded beyond lawyer, advisor,
and Cabinet member to include administrative and investigative duties. 6 In a tripartite system of government, this amalgam of different roles results in the Attorney General serving "three masters" the President, the Congress, and the Judiciary. 17 The Attorney General is responsive to all three branches of government in fulfilling his
various responsibilities.
As the chief law enforcement officer of the nation, the Attorney
General enables the President to fulfill his obligation to faithfully
execute the laws of the United States.'" In his role as legal counsellor, he serves the President by giving advice and opinions when requested.'" Additionally, as a member of the Cabinet, he functions, to
20
varying degrees, as the President's political confidant.
While the role the Attorney General plays with respect to Congress remains undefined, Congress has had a continuing impact on
the office. In the early years of the office, the Attorney General furnished legal opinions to Congress. 2 In more recent times, he offers
his opinion on pending legislation when requested to testify before
congressional committees.12 Immense statutory law relies on the Department of Justice for its administration as well as enforcement.
The Attorney General must submit an annual report to Congress on
the business, activities, and accomplishments of the Department of
23
Justice.
15. Huston, supra note 13, at 1.
16. Meador, The President, the Attorney General, and the Department of Justice, in THE PRESIDENT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1543 (1980) [hereinafter Meador].
17. Huston, supra note 13, at 3.
18. In legal theory, the power authorizing the Attorney General to act for the
President flows from the President through the Attorney General to the various subofficials of the Department of Justice. Miller, supra note 7, at 45.
19. The Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 93 (corresponds to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 511-512 (1982)).
20. Edmund Randolph, George Washington's aide-de-camp in war and attorney
in private life, became the first Attorney General. Huston, supra note 13, at 5-6. Although not originally a member of Washington's Cabinet, Randolph first attended
Cabinet meetings in 1792 and, in doing so, set a precedent for the Attorney General's
participation in policy decisions. Id. at 7.
21. The Attorney General assumed what became the burdensome task of providing Congress with opinions on the drafting and constitutionality of proposed legislation. Huston, supra note 13, at 6. In 1819, Attorney General William Wirt put an
end to the "courtesy" and suggested that Congress change the law if it wished to
continue the custom. Id.
22. Id. The House and the Senate usually obtain legal opinions from their respective offices of legislative counsel. Comment, Constitutional Balance of Powers,
supra note 5, at 350.
23. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES (1870 present).
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The Attorney General serves the Judiciary primarily in his role
as attorney for the government.24 As an attorney, he is an officer of
the court and subject to the court's direction in certain aspects of
litigation.2 The vast structure of the department allows him to delegate much of his lawyering activities through Assistant Attorneys
General. In addition, the 1870 Act created the office of Solicitor
General to assist the Attorney General as head of the government's
litigation.2 6
In serving three masters, the Attorney General naturally encounters conflicts of interest. His office is atypical because it requires the Attorney General to navigate between and within the separation of powers. He is a member of the executive department
serving at the pleasure of the President. He is appointed by the
President, with Senate confirmation, and can be dismissed by the
President without cause.27 At the same time, he is accountable to
the Congress and subject to congressional legislation.28 His powers
flow from acts of Congress and "what Congress gives, Congress can
take away." 2 9 As the link between the White House and the courts,
the Attorney General's position is "quasi-judicial." 0 He is, in effect,
24. Comment, Constitutional Balance of Powers, supra note 5, at 350.
25. Huston, supra note 13, at 4.
26. Act of 1870, ch. 150, § 2, 16 Stat. 162. See Cox, The Government in the
Supreme Court, 44 CFH. B. REC. 221 (1963) (distinction between the private appellate
advocate and the role the Solicitor General plays in the Supreme Court). For the
history, development, and duties of the Solicitor General see Note, The Solicitor
General and Intragovernmental Conflict, 76 MICH.L. REV. 324 (1977) (analysis of the
proper role of the Solicitor General, the common law sources of his responsibilities,
and the accomodation of his competing interests); Note, Government Litigation in
the Supreme Court: The Roles of the Solicitor General, 78 YALE L.J. 1442 (1969) (a
discussion of the Solicitor General's functions in seeking certiorari, confession of error, intra-governmental conflicts, and as amicus curiae).
27. Biden, Balancing Law and Politics: Senate Oversight of the Attorney General Office, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 151, 158 (1990). An example of the tenuous relationship between the President and the Attorney General is found in George H. Williams' anecdote concerning President Andrew Jackson and his Attorney General.
When the Attorney General expressed his doubts as to the existence of a law that
would authorize the President to designate certain banks as U. S. depositories, Jackson responded "Sir, you must find a law authorizing the act or I will appoint an
Attorney General who will." Miller, supra note 6, at 51.
28. Biden, supra note 27, at 154. See Mc Grain v. Dougherty, 273, U.S. 135, 178
(1926) ("...
the powers and duties of the Attorney General and the duties of his
assistants, are all subject to regulation by congressional legislation.").
29. Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings on S.2803
and S.2978 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary,93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Senator Sam J. Ervin). Congress has removed cases from the Attorney General and placed
them under the special counsel's control. See Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597
(1988) (Attorney General's power to remove independent counsel restricted by the
Ethics in Government Act).
30. Meador, supra note 16, at 26. The quasi-judicial thesis relies on the fact
that the office of the Attorney General was created and remains under the Judiciary
Act. Id. President Pierce's Attorney General, Caleb Cushing, perceived his role "not
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a "political officer charged with legal duties."3 1 What sets him apart
from other executive department heads is that along with attending
to vast administrative burdens, the Attorney General must perform
as a lawyer with the special professional obligations that attach. 2
He must act consistently with the President's policies but not let
political considerations or "inappropriate and improper, though not
necessarily illegal" influences sway his legal judgment.3
II.

COMPETING GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS

As Professor Babcock has noted, the interests the Attorney
General represents in his lawyering function are themselves tripartite in nature. 3 There are the interests of the particular client, the
broader interests of the United States, and the interests of the public. Frequently, these interests are in conflict with one another. 5
Where does the Attorney General place his loyalty when conflicts
arise? To what extent does the political process shape legal policy?
These simple questions reveal some of the complexities of the Office
of the Attorney General.
The statute creating the Office of the Attorney General required
only that its occupant be "a meet person, learned in the law."3 The
President appoints the Attorney General and his choice is, in a very
real sense, political.3 1 The primary qualification is that the appointee must be a person in whom the President may place total
confidence. 8 The President wants his Attorney General "to be not
[as] counsel giving advice to the government, but as a public officer, acting judicially,
under all the solemn responsibilities of conscience and legal obligation." Donahoe,
The Model Rules and the Government Lawyer, A Sword or Shield? A Response to
the D.C. Bar Special Committee On Government Lawyers and The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 987, 995 n.52 (1989) (citing Office and
Duties of Attorney General, 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 326, 334 (1854)).
31. Miller, supra note 7, at 51.
32. Meador, supra note 16, at 27-49.
33. Meador, supra note 16, at 33.
34. Babcock, Defending the Government: Justice and the Civil Division, 23 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 181, 184-93 (1990).
35. Id. at 181. Conflicts exist at all levels of the Department of Justice. For a
discussion of conflicts facing the government lawyer, see Josephson & Pearce, To
Whom Does the Government Lawyer Owe the Duty of Loyalty When Clients Are in
Conflict?, 29 HOWARD L. REV. 539 (1986) (resolution of the government lawyer's conflicts of interest based on a public interest approach and an ethical approach); Comment, Conflicts of Interest in Inspector General, Justice Department, and Special
ProsecutorInvestigations of Agency Heads, 35 STAN. L. REV. 975 (1983) (examination
of conflicts of interest that arise when executive branch officials are under
investigation).

36. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, supra note 9.
37. See Richardson, The Building of a New Confidence, 45 N.Y. ST. B.J. 455,
456 (1973) ("... the Attorney General has been more than a political appointee, he
has frequently been-before and after he came to the Department of Justice-a political
operative as well.").
38. Rosenbaum, Choosing a Friend for Attorney General, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28,
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only a competent attorney[], but to be politically and philosophically attuned to the policies of the administration." 9 The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed that
legal competence is not the only qualification. In Leonard v. Douglas, a case in which a First Assistant to an Assistant Attorney General sought to retain his position after a change in administrations,
the court stated:
The [Attorney General] is not only the chief law officer of the Government of the United States for law enforcement purposes; he is a member of the Cabinet and must be available to advise the President as
counsellor on matters involving policy as well as law. . . [M]ethods of
law enforcement may appropriately be influenced by a choice among
several possible courses of action, all of which may be deemed to be
within law. Legal competence. . .is not the only qualification for one
holding high office with policy making responsibility. . .[I]n his own
responsibility also the Assistant Attorney General needs as his First
Assistant someone in whom he can confide, and to whom he can turn
with trust in his judgment as well as his legal ability. 0
It is argued that the President and the Attorney General need
to have a close relationship. 4 ' Several reasons have been cited in explanation. First, the President, vested with the authority of the electorate, has the right to see that his political agenda is carried out.
Because it is ethically and politically inappropriate for the President
to become involved in individual lawsuits,42 and because the Attorney General has broad discretion in prosecution and litigation matters, 43 the President must have confidence in the decisions the At1976, at 13, col. 4.
39. Rehnquist, The Old Order Changeth: The Department of Justice Under
John Mitchell, 12 ARIz. L. REV. 251, 252 (1970). See Biden, supra note 27, at 155 ("..

• it is only a political ally of the President who gets appointed Attorney General in
the first place.").
40. 321 F.2d 749, 751-52 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
41.

Rosenbaum, supra note 37. See Conference on the President, the Attorney

General, and the Department of Justice, in THE PRESIDENT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 101 (1980) [hereinafter Conference] (Griffen Bell
stated that personal contact and openness are essential elements between the President and the Attorney General); Miller, supra note 7, at 47 (The Attorney General
requires direct and clear contact with the President).

42. Rosenbaum, supra note 37. The President may certainly influence
prosecutorial direction as a matter of policy, but he "cannot without undermining the
integrity with which the law is enforced tell the legal officers of the government what
to do or not to do in a particular case." E. RICHARDSON, THE CREATIVE BALANCE 27
(1976). President Carter became quite interested in a highly publicized case that
came to his personal attention while campaigning in Texas. He urged his Attorney
General, Griffen Bell, to prosecute. Bell, Office of the Attorney General's Client Relationship, 36 Bus. LAW. 791, 795 (1981). When Bell refused, the President was unmis-

takably disappointed but told a press conference that while he appoints the Attorney
General, "It]he prosecutorial discretion is vested in the [A]ttorney [Gleneral. I can
remove the [A]ttorney [G]eneral, but I cannot tell him who to prosecute, I cannot tell
him who not to prosecute." Id.
43. Rosenbaum, supra note 37. See Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C.
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torney General makes in such matters."" Second, the legal disputes
among the various agencies of which the Attorney General is the
arbiter should reflect, where possible, Administration policy.' 8
Third, in the politically charged atmosphere of the nation's capital,
ranking within the power structure is a senstive matter.' The Attorney General must know the President's mind if he is to assert his
authority and function effectively as a Cabinet member.' 7 As the
lawyer for the President, the conduit through which the President
faithfully executes the law, a close political and legal advisor to the
President, and a Cabinet member, it would seem that the Attorney
General's duty of loyalty is to the President.
However, others argue that the Attorney General's loyalty
should rest with the government of the United States. In his capacCir. 1966) (whether and when prosecution is initiated is within the Attorney General's discretion). In addition to the powers of prosecution and litigation, the Attorney General decides whether and when to deport, enjoin, commute, and settle cases.
V. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE xiii (1971).
44. Rosenbaum, supra note 37. Former Assistant Attorney General for the
Criminal Division, Philip B. Heymann, remarked that it is useful social pretense for
the public to perceive that the Department of Justice prosecutes a case because it has
to and not by reason of a discretionary decision. Conference, supra note 41, at 94-95.
In Heymann's opinion, it is hypocritical to give the impression that a decision to
prosecute has been made by the Department of Justice or the Attorney General
when, in fact, it was the President's decision. Id. Heymann believes that the President, as an elected official, should "take the heat" for his discretionary decisions. Id.
45. Policies affecting the use of the government's legal resources are generally
set by the President and the Attorney General, but even if there is no direct Presidential involvement, the policies set by the Attorney General will reflect the Administration's political and philosophical stance. Meador, supra note 16, at 28. "Very few
Presidents are likely to sit down and make policy on all issues. Therefore, all of these
policy issues or most of them, tend to arise in the context of specific cases ...
[P]residential intervention in a specific case] .. .may be the only way in which the
policy is produced." Conference, supra note 41, at 81 (remarks of John H.
Shenefield).
46. Miller, supra note 7, at 47. "If the Attorney General is to serve unambiguously as the nation's chief law officer it is essential that the Attorney General, and not
any other lawyer, in the White House or elsewhere, be the person to whom the President looks for advice and decisions on legal matters." Meador, supra note 16, at 41.
The President must view the Attorney General as a strong supporter or else the President may resort to other sources of legal advice. Id. at 39-40. Former head of the
Office of Legal Counsel, now Justice Antonin Scalia, wrote:
The White House will accept distasteful legal advice from a lawyer who is unquestionably "on the team;" it will reject it, and indeed not even seek it, from
an outsider-when more permissive and congenial advice can be obtained closer
to home, And it almost always can be, if not from the White House Counsel
then from one of the Cabinet members who soon become advisors of any
administration.
Id. at 40.
47. Miller, supra note 7, at 47. Unfortunately, the Attorney General may be
called upon in his Cabinet role to lobby congressmen regarding matters unrelated to
the Department of Justice. Meador, supra note 16, at 48. It has been said that the
undesirable political image this activity generates is offset by the opportunity for "the
voice of the law to be heard" in Cabinet meetings and the assurance that "only lawful
policies will be adopted." Id.
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ity as chief law enforcement officer, his ultimate duty demands fidelity to the Constitution and not to the President."' Closely related to
this concept is the third position which suggests that the Attorney
General owes his loyalty to the "public interest.""9 In support of this
view, proponents assert that:
[T]he [Attorney General] assumes a public trust, for the government,
over-all and in each of its parts, [and] is responsible to the people in
our democracy with its representative form of government. Each part
of the government has the obligation of carrying out, in the public
interest, its assigned responsibility in a manner consistent with the
Constitution, and the applicable laws. In contrast, the private practitioner represents the client's personal or private interest.5 0
It has been pointed out that furthering the public interest does
not mean that the public is the "client" in the traditional sense of
the attorney-client relationship. Rather, the Attorney General is required to observe the public interest in the performance of his duties as head of the Department of Justice." In this vein, he would
prioritize his responsibilities on the basis of how his performance
"will affect the obligation of the government to serve the public interest," rather than on a determination of who the true client is. 52
Who decides what is in the public interest? Does the Attorney
General take his cue from one of his three masters or does he detect
the tone of public policy himself? Some Attorneys General have
been of the opinion that the President's agenda is their agenda."
One should look to the President for a definition of the public inter48. Comment, ConstitutionalBalance of Powers, supra note 5, at 352-53. See
Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1293, 1298 (1987) ("...
the attorney's ultimate duties run the executive
branch as a whole.").
49. Donahoe, supra note 30, at 1000. See Moore, Realms of Obligation and Virtue, in PUBLIc DUTIES: THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 3, 9 (1981)
(the public character of the responsibility imposes a higher duty on the government
official and an obligation to serve the public). Former Attorney General Elliot Richardson, explaining his plan for the Department of Justice stated, "We start from the
awareness that we are accountable to the people of the United States. The Department of Justice has no interests and no objectives separable form theirs." Richardson,
The Building of a New Confidence, 45 N.Y. ST. B.J. 455, 457 (1973). But see, Report
by the District of Columbia Bar Special Committee on Government Lawyers and
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 3 WASH. LAW. Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 53
(adopting the "agency as client" approach as more applicable to an ethical code than
either the "public interest" or "government as client" strategies) [hereinafter Report
of the D.C. Bar].
50. The Government Client and Confidentiality: Opinion 73-1, 32 FED. B.J. 71,
72 (1973).
51. Id.
52. Note, Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1415 (1981).
53. The newly appointed Attorney General, Richard Thornburg, announced
that the President's agenda was his agenda. Biden, supra note 27, at 155-56.
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est54 After all, the President was elected to deal with issues the
public deemed important. His policies may be expressed in the form
of "proposed legislation, the issuance of rules or regulations, law enforcement strategies or priorities, or unilateral actions regarding foreign policy or national defense.""6 However, Congress could make
the same claims to electoral mandate. Each member of Congress
presumably represents the interests of his constituency and
manifests that public interest through the legislative process." The
Supreme Court also plays a part in shaping public policy. Judicial
decisions on issues of great public interest often have far reaching
consequences. 7
While it appears that all three masters participate in defining
and establishing public policy, the Attorney General lacks the authority to do the same. A creature of statute, he lacks his own constituency and, therefore, any right to speak for the public results
from acquiesence on the part of Congress and the President rather
than on intrinsic power belonging to the Office of the Attorney
General."8

III.

POLITICAL POLICIES AND THE LEGAL PROCESS

The principles of respresentative democracy depend on the existence of political competition. The people must have the ability to
choose leaders and programs and mandated changes must actually
take place if government is to achieve its representative purpose."
Naturally, then, the political process translates into legal policies.
This interpretation of "politics," while no doubt the outgrowth of
partisan energy, is often referred to as politics in the "philosophical"
sense - the concept of "society."6 0 The point of departure from this
54. Babcock, supra note 34, at 192.
55. Fein, Promotingthe President'sPolicies Through Legal Advocacy: An Ethical Imperative of the Attorney General, 30 FED. B. NEWS & J., Sept-Oct. 1983, at
406, 408.

56. An argument could be made that Congress does not set public policy but
reacts to public interests. Once the public need is determined, legislation responds to
fill
the need.
57. De Tocqueville's legendary statement that "scarcely any question arises in
the United States which does not become, sooner or later, a subject of judicial debate
is validated....in the plethora of federal case law. DE TOQUEVILLE, supra note 7, at
207. For a survey of federal litigation involving administration policy, see Fein, supra
note 55.
58. Comment, Constitutional Balance of Powers, supra note 5, at 355.
59.

M. REJAI, supra note 3.

60. Johnson, Our Nation's Energy and Resources - Decision Making in Conflict, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 199-200 (1990). The etymology of politics is the Greek
polis, meaning city-state. Polites is the citizen who is a free member of the polis.
Accordingly, politike, or politics, is the science of the city-state and its members.
Plato and Aristotle viewed the polis as the only form of civilized human existence,
incorporating the concept of society. Therefore, politics, in the philosophical sense, is
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view of politics occurs when it is perceived that the political process
is manipulating the legal process and perverting it to serve strictly
partisan purposes."' As a result, the public loses confidence in the
fair administration of law. An even greater recusant product of this
misuse of process is the ensuing political name-calling and interbranch power struggle. 2
It has often been proposed that the Department of Justice and
the role of the Attorney General be "depoliticized." s Suggestions
range from simplier steps such as removing functions from the Department of Justice like the judicial selection process,6 4 to amending
the Hatch Act 5 to include the Attorney General and other appointed officials in the Department of Justice,6 6 to a complete restructuring of the department. Some of the proposed solutions give
rise to separation of powers problems.6 Others evoke the unsettling
prospect that an independent Department would encourage arbitrariness or elitism. 9 One commentator believes that the problem
the science of society, as well as, the science of the state.

ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN

ETHICS 312-13 (M. Ostwald trans. 1986).

61. Richardson, supra note 37, at 27. See Biden, supra note 27, at 151 (the
Attorney General and the President politicize the Department of Justice when they
seek to pass the President's agenda by means other than the legislative process).
62. Compare Rehnquist, supra note 39, at 252 (defending the appointment of
politically active lawyers to the Department of Justice); with Rogovin, Reorganizing
Politics Out of the Department of Justice, 64 A.B.A. J. 855 (June 1978) (questioning

whether the Department of Justice "should be run by lawyers who march to a drumbeat emanating from the White House"). See also Miller, supra note 13, at 66-70
(Congress trys to retain control over details of administration through delegation of
power to congressional committees); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953-54 n.1
(1983)(Congress' authority to delegate power to administrative agencies does not permit it to control the administration of the laws through congressional veto).
63.

Hearings, supra note 29.

64. The judicial selection process often requires considerable negotiation between the Department of Justice and the Senate in order to secure confirmation of
nominees. The nature of the process is essentially political and results in what has
been termed as the "politics of quid pro quo." Rogovin, supra note 62, at 857-58.
65. Section 9 of The Hatch Act, designed to proscribe federal employees from
active participation in political management or campaigns, does not apply to the legislative and judicial branches. Act of Aug. 2, 1939, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (corresponds
to 5 U.S.C. §7324 (1982)). For a discussion of Hatch Act, see J. ECCLES, THE HATCH
ACT AND THE AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY (1982).
66. Rogovin, supra note 62, at 857. Former Attorney General Benjamin A. Civiletti said, when interviewed shortly after taking office, ".... independence with regard
to case management, initiation and disposition is vital and important and rather absolute. The Hatch Act wouldn't bother me in the slightest if it were applied to people
in the Justice Department." Q. and A. with the New Attorney General, 65 A.B.A. J.
1497, 1502 (Oct. 1979).
67. Meador, supra note 16, at 57-68. See Conference, supra note 41, at 130-149
(various former Department of Justice officials discuss the suggestions in Daniel Meador's paper).
68. Note, Removing Politics from the Justice Department: Constitutional
Problems with Institutional Reform, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 336 (1975).

69. Former Attorney General Griffen Bell warned that if the Department of
Justice became too confident of its own power, it may ignore higher authority. Bell,
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would only be created anew because the President needs some vehicle through which to carry out his consitutional mandate to faithfully execute the law."
In addition to attacking the political influence problem on the
department level, at least one former Department of Justice appointee recommends addressing it on an individual level." Presidents frequently appoint politically active lawyers to the Office of
Attorney General, as well as to significant posts within the department. 2 There is a question whether the individual with political
ambitions belongs in the Department of Justice where good lawyering often requires the politically unpopular decisions likely to impede a political career. One commentator asserts:
[The Attorney General] and his department should always be in the
position to render objective, reasoned legal advice. To ensure the objectivity of the advice, political party affairs should be left to the
party's counsel, and the [P]resident's personal affairs should be left to
personal counsel. Particularly in these areas of the [P]resident's affairs the [A]ttorney [G]eneral should stand aside.7
This point of view leads to a conclusion that loyalty to the executive office obscures legal judgment to the point where legal advocacy becomes political advocacy. The implication is that private interests displace the public interest and, as such, are beyond the
scope of the Attorney General's professional responsibilities. 4 The
antithetical point of view is that "ethical imperatives derived from
our constitutional system of representative government and separation of powers obligate the [Attorney General] to devote virtually
unreservedly his legal talents and insights towards advancing the
supra note 42, at 797. His warning also embraced the need for intradepartmental
control so that decisions coming from the Department of Justice would be consistent
and founded on the law and not on departmental predilection. Conference, supra
note 41, at 96. Former Attorney General Civiletti's concerns regarding an independent Department of Justice centered around the lack of Constitutional authority,
problems of accountability absent a system of checks and balances, and the inefficiency of government that might result. Q. & A. with the New Attorney General,
supra note 66.
70. Hearings,supra note 30, at 95 (statement of Robert G. Dixon, Jr.).
71. See Rogovin, supra note 62 (appointments to the offices of Attorney General and U.S. Attorney are the political spoils of successful presidential campaigns).
72. Rehnquist, supra note 39, at 252. Lawyers who were active on both sides of
the partisan fence before appoinment to the Department of Justice include Warren
Burger, Ramsey Clark, Robert Kennedy, Richard Kleindienst, John Mitchell, William
Rehnquist, William Ruckelshaus, and Byron White. Many former Attorneys General
moved on to other appointments after leaving the Department of Justice. Huston,
supra note 13, at 33-34.
73. Rogovin, supra note 62, at 856.
74. See Fleishman, Self Interest and PoliticalIntegrity, in PUBLIc DUTIES: THE
MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 52 (1982) (examination of the ethical
problems that arise when representing private interests transforms into representation of self interests).
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policies of the President through legal advocacy." 5 These contrasting opinions raise the question of what "ethical imperatives" guide
76
the Attorney General.
IV.

SETTING ETHICAL NORMS

As the practice of law in America has changed, so have the profession's ethical standards. In the eighteenth century, professional
ethics were rooted in the "code of the gentleman" so that rules of
etiquette and good grace induced regulation through effective peer
pressure. 77 By the twentieth century the country's population had
grown immensly. The legal profession experienced a comparable
growth, both in the body of developed law and in the number of
legal practioners. To complicate matters further, a larger more diverse population demanded increased legal services. It is not surprising that traditional concepts of self-regulation could not continue to
restrain unethical behavior. 71 In response, the legal community endeavored to establish principles of professional conduct.
Attorneys are bound by the version of the American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional Responsibility or Model Code of
Professional Conduct adopted in the jurisdictions in which they are
admitted to the bar.79 The same holds true for the government attorney. These Codes, drafted primarily to respond to the ethical issues confronting the lawyer in private practice, do not provide solutions to the problems of particular concern to a federal attorney.8 0
Recognizing the deficiency in ethical guidelines, the federal bar
adopted the supplemental Federal Ethical Considerations and Opinion 73-1 of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the Federal Bar
75. Fein, supra note 55.
76. The ethical imperatives under consideration here are distinct from those
personal ethics and philosophies which contribute to the lawyer's professional conduct. However, for an interesting insight into how personal philosophy affects the
Attorney General's discharge of his duties see R. KLEINDIENST, JUSTICE (1985); E.
RICHARDSON, THE CREATIVE BALANCE (1976); Conference, supra note 41.

77. In 1758, John Adams and Samuel Quincey took the following simple oath of
office which served as their code of ethics as well:
You shall do no falsehood nor consent to any being done in the court ....
You
shall delay no man for lucre or malice, but you shall use yourself in the office
of an attorney within the court according to the best of your learning and discretion, and with all good fidelity as well to the court and to the client. So help
you God!
C. BROWN, JOHN ADAMS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 182 (1950).
78. Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J.
909, 909-10 (1980).
79. Miller, supra note 48, at 1293 n.1. Other departmental or agency restrictions
may also apply to the individual government lawyer. Report of the D.C. Bar, supra
note 49.
80. Poirier, The Federal Government Lawyer and Professional Ethics, 60
A.B.A. J. 1541 (1974).
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Association." The supplemental principles correspond to the nine
canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility82 while Opinion
73-1 addresses the difficulties involved with the government client
and confidentiality.8 3 The commendable federal bar effort, however,
failed to prevent the subsequent breaches of professional ethics that
cast a giant shadow on the Department of Justice.
The shockwave of the Watergate scandal prompted Congress to
enact the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.8' The Act required all
government officials and employees above a specified rank to file financial disclosure statements," and it set a ceiling on the amount of
permissible outside income. Other provisions created the Office of
Government Ethics,8 restricted potential post employment conflicts
of interest,8 7 outlined the authority of the special prosecutor, 8 and
established the office of Senate Legal Counsel. 9 In 1982, the Act was
amended to replace the special prosecutor with an independent
counsel whose powers and duties were more clearly defined. 0 The
1987 amendment reauthorized, clarified, and strengthened the independent counsel process.8
Title IV of the Act instructs the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, in consultation with the Attorney General, to develop rules and regulations that identify and resolve conflicts of interest.92 The President or the Office of Personnel Management is
then responsible for "promulgating" the regulations. 3 Subsequent
history has shown that the 1978 Act failed to accomplish its objectives, at least with respect to government attorneys. One may find
this system of formulating ethical standards analogous to "the fox
guarding the chicken coop."
How then should an ethical standard take form? On what tenets should it rely? The essence of any ethical creed is in a shared
moral philosophy. One's commitment to its principles may be the
consequence of a deeply rooted conviction or mere tacit agreement.
81. Id. The status of Opinion 73-1 is just that, and has less weight than the
Ethical Considerations. Id. at 1543. Application of the Opinion is on a case by case
basis. Id.
82. Id. at 1542-44.
83. Id. at 1542.
84. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978).
85. 2 U.S.C. § 701 (1978); 5 U.S.C. app. § 201 (1978); 28 U.S.C. app. § 301 (1978).
86. 5 U.S.C. app. § 401 (1978)
87. 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1978).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 581 (1978).
89. 2 U.S.C. § 288 (1978).
90. Ethics in Government Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (1982)
(corresponds to 28 U.S.C. § 591 et seq.).
91. Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101
Stat. 1293 (1987) (corresponds to 28 U.S.C. § 591 et seq.).
92. 5 U.S.C. app. § 402 (1978).
93. Id.
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In either case, an ethical creed designed to guide the legal profession
must address the practical elements that create a lawyer's ethical
dilemma.
Perhaps the most well-known and influential precept of legal
ethics is found in Canon 7 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility: "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within
the Bounds of the Law." 9 However, the language from which this
doctrine was taken had quite a different meaning in its original context. Lord Brougham, appearing before the House of Lords in his
defense of Queen Caroline, said:
[A]n advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes his client, knows in
the discharge of that office, but one person in the world, that client
and none other. To save that client at all expedient means, to protect
that client at all hazards and costs to all others, and among others to
himself, is the highest and most unquestioned of his duties; and he
must not regard the alarm, the suffering, the torment, the destruction
which he may bring upon any other.9
Lord Brougham was not advancing a theory of legal ethics but was
threatening political ruin by publicly exposing King George IV's secret marriage. He was not exhorting misconduct but, rather, was
threatening to tell the truth in order to force the King to withdraw
his bill for divorce.9 6
Several scholars suggest that lawyers are commited to this
"hired gun" doctrine not because they "want to engage in misconduct . . ." but because it provides "a convenient basis for rationalizing such conduct if the occasion should arise." 7 One commentator
has gone so far as to say that "at best the lawyer's world is a simplified moral world; often it is an amoral one; and more than occasionally, perhaps, an overtly immoral one." 98
Suspicion regarding a lawyer's honesty is nothing new. 9 However, this suspicion intensifies with the public's higher expectations
for those in government. Consequently, the proliferation of unethical conduct at top levels of government in recent years, has caused
government attorneys as a whole to suffer at the expense of "the
few." The pervasive negative sentiment toward lawyers in general,
and government lawyers in particular, has fostered a wealth of dis94. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
95. J. Dos PASsos, THE AMERICAN

Canon 7 (1980).
141-42 (1907).

RESPONSIBILITY

LAWYER

96. Patterson, supra note 78, at 909-10 (1980). King George IV took Lord
Brougham's threat seriously and withdrew his bill for divorce. Id.
97. Id.
98. Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals:Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1,
2 (1975). The number of lawyers involved in the Watergate scandal was offered in
support of this theory. Id. at 2-3.

99. G. HAZARD,

ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW Xiii

(1978).
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course on professional duties and obligations.'0 0 The theorists fall
primarily into two groups. The first proposes a higher ethical standard for the government lawyer based on the belief that the government attorney serves some higher purpose.' They do not, however,
define the specific criteria of the higher standard. The second group
finds existing standards adequate. Theirs is a more conventional attorney-client perspective, defining duty as it "runs to the officer
having the power of decision over the issue."1 2
While there may be a fine line between advancing policy and
controlling litigation, the distinction must still be drawn so that political advocacy does not discredit the legal process. 10 3 Inevitably,
some "peculiarities of circumstance" will result in conduct falling
outside the ethical norm which closely parallels that which falls
within it. In spite of the shortcomings, "conduct specific" (objective)
standards to which conflicting rights and duties can be referred surpass "broad principles" (subjective) standards in terms of avoiding
conflicts and uncertainty.01 4
Simply stated, there is no perfect set of ethics. Attorneys, like
other people, are faced with ethical challenges every day. A "conduct specific" ethical standard governs the lawyer's conduct in the
predictable circumstances. However, because ethics is essentially
prospective, i.e. "there is ethics only where there is a problem to
solve,"'0 5 numerous situations giving rise to ethical considerations
are as yet unknown. The "conduct specific" standard will not have
addressed these problems, but that does not diminish its importance
or value. What it does mean is that an ethical standard must be
flexible enough to adapt to the "peculiarity" of the new circumstance. To the degree that an ethical creed must incorporate unde100. Numerous books, scholarly journals, and newspaper articles have addressed the problems of legal ethics. In addition to the sources cited above, see e.g.
Cox, The Lawyer's Public Responsibilities, 4 HuM. RTS. 1 (1974) (the government
lawyer's responsibilities in the aftermath of Watergate); Dam, The Special Responsibility of Lawyers in the Executive Branch, 55 CHI. B. REC. 4 (1974) (executive branch
lawyers have a special responsibility to expose governmental misconduct); Fahy, Special Problems of Counsel for the Government, 33 FED. B.J. 331 (1974) (the government lawyer's responsibility is to the people).
101. Moore, supra note 49.
102. Josephson & Pearce, supra note 35; Miller, supra note 48.
103. Former Attorney General Griffen Bell points to the University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) as an example of the fine line between
policy and controlling litigation. Bell, supra note 42, at 794. Lawyers at the White
House rewrote the Supreme Court brief Bell had submitted to the President. Id. Bell
had to step in to protect the Solicitor General by directing the head of the Civil
Rights Division of the Justice Department to "lock themselves in a room, write the
brief, and finish it." Id. The finished product was in line with the President's policy
because Bell knew it in advance. Id.
104. Conduct specific standards permit the attorney to make his ethcal choices
knowing, or at least being able to predict, the consequences of his actions,
105. S. DE BEAUVOIR, THE ETHICS OF AMBIGUITY 18 (1948).
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fined conduct, it is a "broad principles" standard.
The challenge for the Attorney General, the Department of Justice, and the Congress together is to develop an ethical creed that is
not limited by the experience of history. It will require a new vision
unhampered by historical ideas of what is "necessary," who the client is, and to whom the Attorney General owes his duty of loyalty.
It must leave behind old definitions in favor of inventing new meaning for a new context. These measures are imperative if the Attorney
General and the Department of Justice are to ethically discharge the
administration of justice. The principles of democratic government
demand as much.
CONCLUSION

It is possible for the Attorney General to serve his three masters
and still maintain appropriate relationships. The Attorneys General
who have successfully done so are viewed as the exception to the
rule, ' rather than an example of the rule in operation. A rule may
apply to anyone who chooses to make use of it. But, even a "conduct
specific" creed must not so bind the lawyer that adherence to it robs
the creed of its meaning or the lawyer of his profession. Nor should
"broad principles" provisions permit political maneuvering to vilify
its purpose. The goal should not be fixed once and for all, but defined along the way which leads to the goal. A two tiered standard
may not be a perfect solution to the Attorney General's ethical dilemmas, and its application may be difficult. It is, however, better
than none at all.
Paula K. Maguire

106. Attorney General Edward Bates is often cited as one of the exceptions.
Appointed by President Lincoln, Bates declared, "[tihe office I hold is not properly
political, but strictly legal; and it is my duty, above all other ministers of State to
uphold the Law and to resist all encroachments, from whatever quarter, of mere will
and power." Miller, supra note 7, at 51. See Biden, supra note 27, at 156 (former
Attorney General Edward Levi was one of the rare exceptions who was able to maintain his personal integrity and the independence of his office).

